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Abstract
This paper provides one of the first comprehensive assessments of spillovers from 2015-
2018 monetary policy tightening phase in the United States to emerging markets, as well
as their determinants. It shows that the spillovers were concentrated in the fixed income
markets, with a relatively small impact of Fed policy on foreign exchange and stock market
price behaviour. The bulk of the impact on fixed income was channeled through rising
interest rate expectations rather than an increase in term premia. The decisions on mon-
etary policy tightening in the United States are found to be of less importance for EM
pricing than the preceding speeches. The markets were differentiating across individual
countries, yet, with exception of the Central and Eastern European economies, based not
on macroeconomic fundamentals but the economic policies shaping them. On the top of
that, the paper investigates the importance of economic and political risk perception as
well as ECB policy for the magnitude of EM spillovers from the Fed tightening, finding
both factors irrelevant.
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1 Introduction
2008-2018 saw unprecedented developments in the monetary policy in the United States (US;
Figure 1). In late 2008, in response to the collapse of the Lehman Brothers and the widespread
recession that followed, the US central bank’s, the Federal Reserve’s (Fed’s), Federal Open
Market Committee (FOMC), already advanced in the easing cycle, brought the fed funds rate
target to the record low of 0.00-0.25 per cent (against 5.25 per cent a year before).
Following that, the FOMC turned to large-scale asset purchases (LSAP), commonly called
quantitative easing (QE), purchasing mortgage-backed securities and Treasury securities worth
a total of 3.3 billion US dollars by 2014, in four rounds of subsequent programmes (LSAP1,
also referred to as QE1: January 2009 – March 2010, LSAP2, called QE2: November 2010 –
June 2011, and Maturity Extension and Reinvestment Policy, labelled as ”Operation Twist”:
October 2011 – June 2012, LSAP3, or QE3: September 2012 – November 2014). Preliminary
studies suggest that the QE programmes provided accommodation equivalent to additional
interest rate cuts of around 5 percentage points (Reynard 2016, Reynard 2018; Figure 2).
In May 2013, the FOMC members started to indicate that the monthly scale of asset
purchases might be gradually reduced, marking the beginning of the so-called QE taper talk.
The reduction in purchases, commonly referred to as QE tapering, started only in early 2014,
and the Fed ultimately ceased to purchase ﬁnancial assets in November 2014. Yet, the US
central bank continued to reinvest the principal payments from its holdings and to roll over the
maturing Treasury securities at auction, in order to keep the size of its balance sheet stable and,
thus, maintain the scale of the accumulation unchanged. Slightly earlier, though, in September
2014, the Fed published a statement on policy normalisation principles and plans, paving a way
for the communication of the upcoming tightening. The document outlined subsequent actions
to be taken in the process of tightening monetary conditions. More speciﬁcally, it stated that
the reinvestment and roll-over policy would be gradually wound down after the fed funds rate
target was increased. In parallel, some FOMC members started to indicate that the increases
in fed funds target could be expected in the near future.
After one year of this open debate, the FOMC increased the fed funds target in December
2015. Following a short pause in early 2016, the interest rate increase cycle was in full swing into
the year. Starting from November 2016, it was bolstered with a gradual wrap up of reinvestment
and roll-over policy, labelled as balance sheet winddown or quantitative tightening (QT).
The fed funds rate target was last increased in December 2018, to 2.25-2.50 per cent, taking
the entire tightening phase to 2.25 percentage points. The Fed balance sheet, in turn, shrank
by a total of 0.7 billion of US dollars by the end of July 2019 when the FOMC announced the
end of the winddown. Assuming a symmetric impact of the balance sheet policy, this could
be an equivalent of full four rate hikes by 0.25 percentage points each. Putting together, the
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scale of monetary policy tightening an equivalent to 3.25 percentage points, i.e. only slightly
less than during the previous rate hike phase in 2004-06 (4.25 percentage points).
Due to the central role played by the US in the global economy and the rise in global
ﬁnancial market integration over past two decades, the FOMC decisions have a signiﬁcant
impact on ﬁnancial markets, not only in this country, but also internationally. This paper is
one of the ﬁrst attempts to assess the magnitude of this impact, and its determinants. It is
an extended version of a preliminary study (Beniak 2019). Yet, contrary to its predecessor, it
focuses solely on emerging market spillovers (EM spillovers) from the Fed policy. Both papers
contribute to the existing literature in the following ways. First, to date, no papers exist
providing an event study focusing solely on the Fed tightening. Second, both papers cover a
relatively wide range of aspects (with respect to the geographical coverage, the events studied
and determinants). Apart from Abagli et al. (2019), Kearns et al. (2019) and Mehrotra
et al. (2019), there is no study focusing on such a wide range of countries, and literature
studying the impact of speeches, which are key in signalling future monetary policy decisions
in the US case, is, too, almost non-existent. Third, the papers consider a wide range of asset
classes, including maturities across the EM yield curves, exchange rates and equities. Previous
studies tended to concentrate on ﬁxed income markets. Fourth, besides the macroeconomic
and ﬁnancial factors, the papers attempt to assess the importance of political, economic and
legal risk perception, using the proceedings from the open-source software. Last, the paper
takes into account that, at least in case of some EM, not only the Fed, but also the European
Central Bank (ECB) monetary policy might potentially matter for some countries. Such an
approach seldom appears in literature, with Kearns et al. (2019) being a notable exception.
The paper ﬁnds that the scale of the spillovers from the Fed tightening in 2015-2018 was
relatively large for ﬁxed income and limited for exchange rates and equities. In spite of QT
in place, the impact on ﬁxed income occurred almost exclusively through a rise in interest
rate expectations, with almost non-existent role of term premia increases, which stands in
contrast to most studies on spillovers from monetary policy in the United States after the
global ﬁnancial crisis. Similarly to previous phases of the 2008-2018 monetary policy cycle,
communication that preceded decisions and operations was more important for the markets
than the actions themselves. The markets were diﬀerentiating across individual countries. This
diﬀerentiation, however, was based on monetary, macroprudential and, to a lesser extent, ﬁscal
policies shaping the fundamentals, with a notable exception of the CEEMEA (Central and
Eastern Europe, Middle East and Africa). Similarly to Kearns et al. (2019), the fundamentals
are found to be of relatively little importance. The markets might have been surprised by the
scale of tightening as shown by renewed responsiveness of asset prices and yields towards the
end of the Fed tightening phase.
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The remaining of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a brief summary of
the existing literature on spillovers from Fed policy. Section 3 explains the data sources and the
models applied for the purpose of the exercise being the subject of this paper. Section 4 presents
the results. Section 5 summarises additional checks performed to conﬁrm the robustness of the
obtained results. Section 6 concludes.
2 Literature review
The literature provides some theoretical insight into several spillover channels from the US
monetary policy. In spite of a large discrepancy in the notation across papers, the consensual
description of these channels could be as follows.
First, the information channel (Amagli et al. 2019) or the expectation channel (Chari et al.
2017) are both labels for a mechanism in line with which the (expected) changes in monetary
policy in the US aﬀect the expectations regarding the interest rate diﬀerentials in the coming
months. For emerging market economies (EM economies) where the interest rates are generally
higher than in the US on average, this means heightened inﬂows, a fall in government bond
yields, appreciation of EM currencies during monetary policy easing in the US, and the opposite
in times of tightening.
Second, in line with the domestic monetary policy channel, the scale of the impact of Fed
policy on EMs depends on the extent to which their central banks follow the former, thus
containing or increasing the interest rate diﬀerential (Amagli et al. 2019 where this channel
is referred to as exchange rate channel). Central banks that are reluctant to cut/raise their
interest rates in tandem with the Fed are likely to see larger capital in-/outﬂows to/from their
respective countries.
Third, the mechanism behind the conﬁdence channel, changes in the Fed monetary policy
aﬀect conﬁdence in the US and other economies. When the Fed eases its monetary policy, the
conﬁdence of agents improves. This squizes term premia and leads to an appreciation of EM
currencies as well as a rise in equity prices. In case of the Fed tightening, however, the channel
works in a more confusing way, particularly for equities. Tightening could be a signal that the
expansion of the US economy as very likely for a prolonged time, which is a positive signal for
the stock prices.
Last, in case of unconventional monetary policy in the US, the central role, particularly
for bond markets, falls to the so-called portfolio balance channel. First elaborated on in a
detail by Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgenssen (2011), it was related to domestic eﬀects of
US Treasury purchases by the Fed. The channel was to operate as follows. The fall in the
US Treasury yields resulting from lower amount of these securities available on the market
would spill over into other assets similar in nature, to the extent the investors would be willing
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to substitute for the latter. However, this mechanism concerns the government bonds of EM
economies, too, as long as they are perceived as some substitutes of US Treasuries during
the period of low risk aversion. For QT, the portfolio balance channel works in reverse, i.e.
unwinding of the abovementioned ﬂows triggers in a rise in yields of a wide range of debt
securities, both in the US and globally.
The existence of the portfolio balance channel could be the reason why the impact of the
Fed monetary policy on emerging markets is relatively large with the balance sheet policy in
place, as shown by and Gilchrist et al. (2014), later on, by Kolasa and Wesolowski (2018) and
Abagli et al. (2019).
The empirical studies on global spillovers from the Fed policy were quite extensive over past
decade. The existing papers found the international spillovers from Fed policy economically
and statistically signiﬁcant. Yet, the bulk of the studies is focused around the easing phase of
the 2008-2018 monetary policy cycle, including, to some extent, the QE taper talk.
Hofmann and Takats (2015) as well as Abagli et al. (2019) show that the spillovers from the
US monetary policy easing existed and became stronger after the FOMC augmented its toolkit
with large-scale asset purchases. Further studies point to adverse impact of QE taper talk and
QE tapering on EMs, as well as the amplifying inﬂuence of weaker fundamentals. Mishra et
al. (2014) as well as Rai and Suchanek (2014), based on an event study, found an evidence of
EM reactions to publication of FOMC oﬃcial communication and speeches, respectively. The
authors of both found that the scale of the market impact had depended on the macroeconomic
fundamentals and the ﬁnancial market depth. Studies by Khatiwada (2017) and Mehrotra et
al. (2019) provide further evidence that the scale of capital outﬂows during QE tapering was
also associated with fundamentals of individual EM economies.
The events surrounding the Fed tightening were strikingly similar to QE taper talk, and
in some cases the anecdotal evidence suggests that the magnitude was even larger this time
(Figure 3). Most notably, Turkey and Argentina, which both had just emerged from a recession,
were experiencing signiﬁcant outﬂows and depreciation of their respective currencies. In the
latter case, the country had to resort to the IMFs Stand-By Arrangement.
In contrast to QE taper talk, the Central and Eastern European economies (CEE economies)
appear relatively calm places this time. Based on existing literature, this could be explained
with stronger links with the euro area, where monetary policy has been relatively accommoda-
tive in spite of some reduction in the scale of easing (Jab lecki et al. 2016).
The literature focusing speciﬁcally on Fed tightening of 2015-2018 is almost non-existent at
the time this paper is being drafted. In line with the simulation results based on Federal Reserve
Board models in Kamin (2016), the Fed tightening should result in higher market interest rates
and currency depreciation in the largest EM economies, yet the impact was projected to be
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limited. Dahlhaus and Vasishtha (2014) ran a simulation of a policy normalisation shock, and
found that the ﬂows to the EM economies should be aﬀected to a similar, rather small, extent
compared to that during the QE taper talk episode. Beckword and Crowe (2017) provided
evidence that this market reaction could have been associated to some degree with safe haven
ﬂows, thereby hinting at macroeconomic fundamentals of individual EMs as a likely driver of
capital outﬂows. Koepke (2016) argues that EM asset prices react to surprising rather than
expected announcements. There are also a couple of papers discussing developments more
speciﬁcally, eg. in ﬁxed income markets, such as Avdijev and Hale (2018), Abagli et al. (2018
and 2019) or Kearns et al. (2019). Avdiyev and Hale (2018) show that the Fed monetary
policy impacted the international lending ﬂows. Abagli et al. (2018 and 2019) suggest, in turn,
that this policy inﬂuenced bond market pricing to a larger extent than its local equivalents
did. Kearns et al. (2019) indicate in addition that local EM fundamentals played a relatively
small role in shaping Fed policy spillovers to these economies, pointing to signiﬁcant impact of
ﬁnancial market integration.
3 Data and methodology
The study in this paper has two stages: the event study and identiﬁcation of market impact
determinants. In the ﬁrst stage, I conduct a series of event studies for 15 EM small open
economies with ﬂexible exchange rate regimes, Polands peers, as well as Poland itself. This
stage is meant to identify the scale of market reaction to events associated with Fed tightening
across time. The second stage is regressing the output of the event study against a wide set
of macroeconomic, ﬁnancial and other variables to determine which of them drove the market
most.
3.1 Event study
The event study is carried out on daily market data provided by Bloomberg. The event studies
concerned 2-, 5- and 10-year government bond yields (if unavailable, the maturities closest to
those; changes in basic points), MSCI stock market indices (per cent changes) and exchange
rates against the US dollar (per cent changes; for data sources see Table 1).
Furthermore, I performed event studies for 5-year term premia estimated based on zero-
coupon bond prices. The methodology for was the same as in Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005),
i.e.:
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is the log yield for n-year discount bond at time t,
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is the holding period return.
The estimates shown in Figure 4 suggest that term premia were following a moderately
downward trend in 2014-2018, with the exception of the CEE economies where term premia
were broadly stable.
The event study window is 2-days wide, meaning that the market reaction around the event
is deﬁned as a two-day change, between the day after and the day before the event. This is
in line with most papers studying the market impact of unconventional monetary policies, eg.
Chen et al. (2014), Mishra et al. (2014) and, most recently, Abagli et al. (2019). Previously,
this approach was chosen by Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) or Gagnon et al.
(2011). A 2-day window is narrow enough not to capture the eﬀects of other shocks but large
enough to capture market reaction across diﬀerent time zones.
The event study time span is framed by the announcement of the statement on policy
normalisation principles and plans in September 2014 mentioned in Section 1 and end-2018,
i.e. just after the last fed funds rate target hike in the 2008-2018 monetary policy cycle.
Three various types of events are studied: the FOMC members speeches, the FOMC oﬃcial
communication (press releases and minutes), and the operations related to QT. The last type of
events are the days of outright sales of System Open Market Account (SOMA) assets available
on the New York Fed website.
The speeches associated with Fed monetary policy tightening are selected with the help of
Python Counter, based on the presence of the following keywords: ”normalization”, ”tighten-
ing”, ”balance sheet”, or their equivalents and grammatical variations, all solely in relation to
the Fed monetary policy. If at least one of these words appears in a speech, it is considered in
further steps of the study. If ”balance sheet” appears in the speech and is related to the Fed
balance sheet, the speech is classiﬁed as related to the balance sheet adjustment. If it does
not but tightening is elaborated on, it is assumed that the speech referred to the fed funds
rate hike. Table 2 shows the general statistics of speeches studied, while Figure 5 depicts the
frequency with which these words appeared in individual speeches. All speeches come from
https://www.stlouisfed.org/fomcspeak.
I checked if the abovementioned events were market movers, or policy shocks, in the US,
following the methodology presented in Chari et al. (2017). Namely, monetary policy shocks
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are deﬁned as market reactions in 5-year Treasury futures that signiﬁcantly exceeded the
average. The alternative approach, taken by Abagli et al. (2019), would be to deﬁne market
movers as those who caused a change in 2-year government bond yields, yet, this would imply
scrapping the front-end of the yield curve from the scope of the study.
Then I checked the scale of market reactions to each of the events for all asset classes
considered. Next, I clustered the reactions in the monthly data (cumulative reaction for yields,
averages for the exchange rates and equities), and created two separate panels, for all EMs and
the CEEMEA (which included Poland, Czechia, Hungary, Turkey and South Africa). Last, I
performed a mean test for all ﬁnancial instruments, thereby checking the statistical signiﬁcance
of a change in yield or price.
3.2 Methodology for identifying market determinants
The second stage of the study was to regress the market reactions clustered in monthly data
against various macroeconomic, ﬁnancial and other fundamentals of respective economies in
the corresponding months.
Inﬂuenced by the methodology introduced in Mishra et al. (2015) and, later on, in Abagli
et al. (2019), I structured the equation used for regression as follows:
m
t−1,t+1
i = α
t
i + θ
t
i ∗ T
t−1,t+1
i + λ
t
i ∗ L
t−1,t+1
i + β
t
i ∗ T
t−1,t+1
i ∗ Y
t+
+γti ∗ L
t−1,t+1
i ∗ Y
t + δti ∗ Y
t + ǫti,
(6)
where: mt−1,t+1i is a 2-day change in yields, rates or prices for the i -th asset (where i
assumes values from 1 to 5 for 2-, 5- and 10-year government bonds, term premia, exchange
rates and stock market prices, respectively),
T
t−1,t+1
i =


1, if the change is like for tightening,
0, otherwise,
(7)
L
t−1,t+1
i =


1, if the change is like for loosening,
0, otherwise,
(8)
Y t is a macroeconomic, ﬁnancial or other fundamental variable.
Tightening-like changes are deﬁned as a rise in government bond yields and term premia,
depreciation of EM currencies and a fall in stock market prices. Loosening-like changes are
characterised by the opposite.
The data used for Y t is the latest available at the beginning of the month the event took
place. Most of the characteristics are common to other studies about the market impact of
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QE taper talk, with a couple of modiﬁcations aiming to increase the frequency and thus the
number of observations:
1. macroeconomic variables: (a) forecasts of GDP growth (GDP t), (b) forecasts of CPI
inﬂation (CPIt), (c) forecasts of ﬁscal balance to GDP (FISCt), and forecasts of current
account balance to GDP (CAt) for the current year (for the last quarter of the year, a
weighted average of forecasts for the current year and the following year), as well as (e)
the log level of foreign exchange reserves in relation to GDP (RESt),
2. ﬁnancial variables: (f) log lending to non-ﬁnancial sector, per cent of GDP (a mea-
sure of ﬁnancial integration, INT t), as well as (g) one-month change in the macro-
prudential index based on Carreras et al. (2018), measuring macroprudential policy
stance (MACROPRU t) and (h) one-month interest rate measuring local monetary pol-
icy stance, with the exception of India, Thailand and Korea for which, due to limited
data availability, I used the central bank reference rates (IRt),
3. other variables: (i) risk perception index encompassing political, economic and legal
factors (RISKt), calculated based on Google Trends results for searches of the following
(as in Baker et al. 2016): ”economic”, ”economy, ”uncertain”, ”uncertainty”, ”deﬁcit”,
”parliament”, ”legislation”, ”regulation” and ”conﬂict”, as well as, additionally, ”war”
(given the military tensions in eastern Ukraine which could impact the CEE markets at
the time of 2015-2018 Fed tightening), for local domains and local languages, and (j)
ECB’s monetary policy stance (ECBt), measured with the frequency of Google search
for ”ECB tightening” and ”ECB tapering”.
All forecast and interest rate data come from Bloomberg. Data on foreign exchange reserves,
lending, foreign assets and liabilities have been proceeded from central banks. Information
about macroprudential policies have been extracted from the IMF’s Macroprudential Policy
Survey, central banks and ﬁnancial authorities. Due to limited ﬁnancial data availability,
particularly on macroprudential policy measures, I excluded Peru and Philippines from the
second stage of the study.
The above speciﬁcation diﬀers slightly from that in Beniak (2019) where only one symmet-
rical dummy was considered which made the results hard to interpret. After distinguishing a
separate dummy for tightening-like changes in ﬁnancial assets yields or prices, the estimates for
βti should be viewed as the measures of the macroeconomic, ﬁnancial and other determinants
of the Fed policy impact on asset prices or yields in EMs.
The data sources for all ﬁnancial data are the statistical oﬃces and central banks. Whenever
data frequency was less than one month, I used cubic spline for approximation. For frequencies
greater than one month, I used averages. The macroeconomic forecasts come from Bloomberg.
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The rationale for picking up forecasts for GDP growth, CPI inﬂation as well as ﬁscal and
current account balances instead of the actual number was to increase the frequency of data
(to monthly from quarterly), and to use slightly more forward-looking data that was followed
by the market participants. Monthly data on industrial output could have been used instead
of GDP growth forecasts, yet, particularly given a relative rise in importance of services in EM
economies, with such an approach, I would not have captured the developments in the entire
economies well enough.
Risk perception index was included in this study because the 2015-18 phase of the Fed
tightening coincided with a rise in political and economic risk both globally, due to the un-
expected outcome of the US presidential elections or the Brexit referendum, and locally, for
instance given the abovementioned military tensions in eastern Ukraine or parliamentary and
judiciary disputes in Poland. Anecdotal evidence might suggest that at least the latter could
have exacerbated the outﬂows resulting from the Feds tightening (Figure 7). The risk percep-
tion indices calculated in line with the abovementioned methodology are depicted in Figure 8.
In case of countries for which data based on the original methodology by Baker et al. (2016)
was available, i.e. Brazil and Chile, the correlation coeﬃcients were 0.54 and 0.38, respectively.
For Poland, the correlation with the risk index calculated by Ho lda (2019) is 0.55.
The reason for including the ECB monetary policy stance in this study (Figure 9), in turn,
was to check if the widespread belief among the CEE economists of the shielding impact of
relatively mild monetary policy stance of this central bank was still valid at the time of the
Fed tightening in 2015-2018. As indicated in Jab lecki et al. (2016), thanks to the ECB easing,
the impact of QE taper talk and QE tapering was limited in Poland. The authors pointed
to a relatively high correlation between Polish and German term premia (Table 3), with the
former surprisingly turning negative in early 2010s. However, the ECB policy could have been
an ampliﬁer of adverse impact rather than dampener this time, given the ECB slowing down
the pace of its monetary policy as the Fed proceeded with tightening. The importance of ECB
policy was worth investigating also because a very recent study by Kearns et al. (2019) ﬁnds
that the impact of ECB monetary policy on EM is quite low on average, and, more importantly,
it is almost non-existent for European EMs.
Before running the main regressions, in order to make sure that the events studied here have
not resulted from the macroeconomic surprises to the markets, I ran a regression for changes
in surprise indices for macroeconomic data, provided by UBS for the EM panel.
The equation used for this regression was similar to the basic one (6), yet it was estimated
on daily data:
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(9)
where:
S
t−1,t+1
i =


> 0, if more data releases around the event were better than expected,
< 0, if more data releases around the event were worse than expected,
0, otherwise.
(10)
Changes in St−1,t+1 are deﬁned according to the same time window as for mt−1,t+1i .
Similarly to the main equation (6), the coeﬃcient ψti is the one that should be viewed as the
measure of the scale of macroeconomic surprises’ impact on tightening-like changes in ﬁnancial
asset yields or prices.
Due to the size of datasets, equations (6) and (9) were estimated with ordinary least squares.
The panel data had been normalised.
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4 Results
This section discusses the results from the exercises performed with methodology outlined
above. The section is divided in two subsections, according to the stages of the study. Sub-
section 4.1 discusses the event study results, while subsection 4.2 identiﬁes the market impact
determinants.
4.1 Event study results
Event study results (Table 4, Figures 10-12) imply that during the Fed tightening phase the
EMs reacted rather to speeches than the actual monetary policy decisions or sale operations.
Given a greater response to speeches overall compared to speeches on rates, it appears that
the EM response was getting greater once balance sheet policy was mentioned.
The reaction to oﬃcial communication was, with a notable exception of Turkey and Mexico,
either non-existent, or in the opposite direction than the theory or intuition would imply (Table
3, Figure 12). This may mean that the FOMC members were successful in signalling their
policy plans. Namely, when the actual decisions were taken, they were largely expected by the
markets, at least initially.
The scale of tightening, mainly the pace of QT, must have surprised the markets at some
point, given the renewed rise in ﬁxed market response after balance sheet winddown was
launched, and more signiﬁcant response of some EM economies to QT operations compared
to the oﬃcial documents. This phenomenon was observed particularly in Latin American
economies, most of which which had proven surprisingly resilient when tightening was only
spoken of. In contrast, the CEE economies which were relatively impacted by the FOMC
member speeches, showed resilience to the Fed market operations.
Across asset classes, the greatest response occurred in the ﬁxed income market, growing
with maturities for the CEEMEA and Asian economies, and peaking at 5-year maturity in the
remaining country groups (Table 4). However, contrary to the commonly shared view (see for
instance Jab/lecki et al. 2016, Kolasa and Weso lowski 2018 or Abagli et al. 2019), and in line
with observations in Mehrotra et al. (2019), the increase in long-term government bond yields
seems to have resulted from the rise in the interest rate expectations rather than a pick-up
in bond term premia. In most economies, term premia hardly responded to any events. This
happened in spite of QT which potentially could have triggered a rise in term premia. Lack of
term premia response was most probably because the bulk of the Fed tightening was eﬀected
with increases in fed funds rate target rather than QT.
Exchange rates depreciated on average in reaction to Fed tightening, with a notable ex-
ception of the days surrounding the Fed operations. Contrary to ﬁxed income market, the
reaction was the strongest for documents, not speeches. However, the average number clouds a
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large divergence in terms of scale and even direction of forex market impact across EMs. Latin
American currencies did not respond to Fed tightening at ﬁrst, but as the operations proceeded,
the response of exchange rates for these economies became stronger. For other country groups,
there was not much variation in terms of the scale of response across 2015-2018.
The reaction of the equity market, in turn, is puzzling. Contrary to the intuition, which
would imply a fall in share prices, the stock indices rose across virtually all markets. This could
mark a shift of investors towards equities, worsening proﬁtability of ﬁxed income investment,
or, in line with the conﬁdence channel, that the fact that the Fed was tightening was a proof
of good economic conditions in the US and globally.
On average, the market reactions were muted in all countries that were hardest hit during
QE taper talk, i.e. Latin America and Asia (Table 4). With a notable exception of Mexico,
Latin American markets were left rather unscathed for the most of the Fed tightening phase,
even if, as the tightening proceeded, they became more responsive (Figure 12). At the same
time, market reactions were quite signiﬁcant in the CEE economies (almost unaﬀected by QE
taper talk) at ﬁrst. This might indicate that still relatively accommodative policy of the ECB
and good economic conditions could not cushion the negative market sentiment in the early
stages of the Fed tightneing. Yet, conversely to Latin American economies, the CEE markets
seem to have become more resilient to the Fed tightening with time.
4.2 Identification of market impact determinants
Before turning to the results from the second stage of analysis, I checked to what extent the
events identiﬁed above could be associated with surprises in macroeconomic releases. To do
this, I estimated equation (9). Note, however, that, due to a lack of data, Asian economies
could not be included in the panel used for this estimation.
The estimation results of equation (9) are included in Table 6. The results for ψ imply that
around the time of the events studied, the changes in the UBS macroeconomic surprise index
were not a statistically signiﬁcant reason for tightening-like changes in yields or prices of any
ﬁnancial asset around the events associated with Fed tightening.
Turning to the core of the study, estimations of equation (6) on panel data for all EM
deliver yield results that stand in a partial contrast to those available in the literature so far
(Table 7). Market depth, degree of ﬁnancial integration and the size of international reserves
play relatively little role in determining the scale of changes in ﬁnancial asset yields or prices
associated with the Fed tightening.
The only macrofundamentals that matter for EM asset pricing are the expected inﬂation
and current account balance, with no role for GDP growth predictions. The estimates are
in line with the economic theory and intuition. The higher the expected inﬂation and the
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deeper the forecasted current account deﬁcit, the larger the increase in government bond yields,
depreciation of the currency and a fall in stock prices in EMs resultant from the Fed tightening.
At the same time, the role of policies shaping the fundamentals turned out to be central to
EM impact of the Fed tightening. However, there were large discrepancies with respect to the
degree of their inﬂuence on market behaviour.
In case of ﬁxed and stock income markets, tighter monetary policy was associated with
a larger impact of the Fed tightening. Coupled with the signiﬁcant impact of high inﬂation
on Fed market impact, this may imply that Fed followers, who had been forced to hike their
respective interest rates due to higher inﬂation, were experiencing higher outﬂows. This also
stands in contrast to literature, particularly the description of the functioning of domestic
monetary policy channel.
For the exchange rates, in turn, the mechanism works in reverse. The lower the expected
inﬂation, the weaker the exchange rate. Along with no impact of current monetary policy
decisions on the exchange rate, this could point to somewhat more forward-looking approach
of forex investors compared to ﬁxed income market participants.
Macroprudential policy was the second largest policy determinant of the Fed EM impact,
particularly for the exchange rates and stock prices. More speciﬁcally, exchange rate depre-
ciation and a fall in equity prices were associated with looser macroprudential policy. Less
tight macroprudential policy would have led to higher yields at the front end of the curve.
This market behaviour could have been explained by the investors substituting ﬁnancial assets
for banking products and real estate which would have become more aﬀordable as a result
of loosening macroprudential requirements. Meanwhile, the macroprudential policy was being
tightened in EMs during the entire Fed tightening phase (Figure 6), and so the opposite was
true, particularly for stock markets. Contrary to assumptions provided in Sections 2 and 4.1,
GDP growth expectations, in turn, did not play any role in shaping the magnitude of EM
equity price reaction to Fed tightening.
Fiscal policy also played some, yet rather minor role, in shaping the impact of the Fed
tightening. The inﬂuence of the expected general government deﬁcit was statistically signiﬁcant
in determining the scale of the rise in long-term government bond yields around the events
associated with the US monetary policy tightening. Expectations of deeper general government
deﬁcit were amplifying the rise in these yields.
Contrary to fears expressed in Section 2, political, a rise in risk perception, at least according
to the measure applied for the purpose of this paper, does not seem to have exacerbated the
adverse impact of Fed policies in EMs.
For the CEEMEA economies, the estimation results were quite similar as for all EMs (Table
7), with four reservations.
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The ﬁrst and most important reservation is that macro- and ﬁnancial fundamentals played a
relatively large role in shaping the Fed market impact in the CEEMEA economies. In contrast
to all EMs, the level of reserves and, to a lesser extent, the stock of lending to the economy or
the ﬁnancial market integration played a statistically signiﬁcant role in the CEEMEA countries.
Most notably, a greater rise in the government bond yields at the front end of the curve and
larger depreciation of the currency was associated with a lower level of reserves. In addition,
a rise in 5-year government bond yields was ampliﬁed by a lower level of ﬁnancial integration
and depth.
The second reservation regards a slightly diﬀerent composition of policies shaping the scale
of the Fed policy impact on the CEEMEA economies. In this region, ﬁscal policy plays abso-
lutely no role in this respect. Monetary policy, in turn, is even more important than for all
EMs, while the role of macroprudential policy shifts away from the stock market towards the
ﬁxed income market. Larger rises in 5-year government bond yields are associated with looser
macroprudential policy while for 2-year government bond yields the opposite relationship, ob-
served for all EMs, persists.
The third reservation is that none of the macroeconomic and ﬁnancial variables, apart from
the short-term interest rate, seem to explain the stock market behaviour in the CEEMEA
around the Fed tightening events. The reason for this may relatively more random behaviour
of stock market prices in these countries resulting from a low level of turnover in these markets
following a reduction in the size of open pension funds in two of the CEE economies just before
the start of the observation period.
The fourth reservation is that, contrary to all EMs, risk perception mattered for the Fed
market impact in the CEEMEA. The signiﬁcance of this factor, however, was limited to the
exchange rate. For the remaining asset classes, the importance of risk perception was non-
existent.
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5 Robustness check
I performed four types of robustness checks. The ﬁrst one was checking what the estimation
output look like if, instead of using one variable as a regressor, I used all at once:
m
t−1,t+1
i = α
t
i + θ
t
i ∗ T
t−1,t+1
i + λ
t
i ∗ L
t−1,t+1
i + β
t
i ∗ T
t−1,t+1
i ∗ Y
t+
+γti ∗L
t−1,t+1
i ∗ Y
t + δti ∗ Y
t + ǫti,
(11)
where Y t is a vector of macroeconomic, ﬁnancial or other fundamental variables.
In line with the results, shown in Table 8, the short-term interest rate and, to a lesser extent,
inﬂation would still be the most important drivers of the Fed tightening impact. However,
macroprudential policy disappeared from the picture, replaced in part with the ﬁnancial depth,
in line with Kearns et al. (2019).
The second robustness check was running regressions excluding regressors individually, and
determining the speciﬁcation with the best ﬁt (the largest R2). With these speciﬁcations, the
interest rate and/or inﬂation still play a predominant role, followed by macroprudential policy
which is equally important as ﬁnancial market depth and the degree of ﬁnancial integration in
these speciﬁcations, also conﬁrming the observations in Kearns et al. (2019). The exchange
rates, again, reacted to the expected inﬂation rather than to current macroeconomic policies.
Other policies also play a role in shaping the market impact, yet mostly in ﬁxed income market,
at the front end of the yield curve. Similarly to estimates for (6), political and economic risk,
or the ECBs policy, do not inﬂuence the scale of the Feds market impact (Table 9).
The third approach to check if the results were robust was to simplify the equation used
for estimation, by not including the dummy associated with loosening-like market behaviour:
m
t−1,t+1
i = α
t
i + θ
t
i ∗ T
t−1,t+1
i + β
t
i ∗ T
t−1,t+1
i ∗ Y
t + δti ∗ Y
t + ǫti, (12)
This speciﬁcation yields interesting results where estimates for almost all variables are
statistically signiﬁcant for the EM asset yield or price behaviour around the Fed tightening
episodes (Table 10). Still, however, the interest rate and inﬂation appear to be the most
important factors, and the risk factor plays no role.
The importance of macroprudential and ﬁscal policies for the scale of the Feds tightening
impact is statistically signiﬁcant for most asset classes. Similarly to estimations of equation
(6), the role of macroprudential policy is the largest at the front end of the yield curve and for
the exchange rates and equities. The role of ﬁscal policy is slightly larger than in estimates of
(6), yet still non-existent for the exchange rates.
The main diﬀerences compared to the estimation results for equation (6) are, again, a rela-
tively large role of ﬁnancial market depth and integration. In addition, with this speciﬁcation,
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GDP growth forecasts are found to be of statistically signiﬁcant relevance for the behaviour of
yields or prices of all asset classes. With a notable exception of 5-year government bond yields
and equity prices, the impact is in line with the intuition – the lower the expected growth,
the larger the rise in government bond yields or depreciation of the currency. Equity prices,
however, rise as the expected GDP growth is slower, proving a lack of relevance of expected
higher growth for the increase in stock market prices amid the Fed tightening.
The ECB policy is found to be of statistical signiﬁcance for behaviour of the EM exchange
rates and equity prices during the Fed tightening. A fall in stock market prices was exacerbated
by the ECB tightening. Depreciation in EM exchange rates versus the US dollar was associated
with looser rather than tighter ECB policy, conﬁrming that the ECB could not have shielded
EMs during the Fed tightening phase.
Last, I estimated the equation for the modules of event study results, leaving only the
tightening dummy in place:
|mt−1,t+1i | = α
t
i + θ
t
i ∗ T
t−1,t+1
i + β
t
i ∗ T
t−1,t+1
i ∗ Y
t + δti ∗ Y
t + ǫti, (13)
The results are broadly in line with the previous robustness checks (Table 11). The role
of fundamentals shaping the degree of Fed impact, with a notable exception of GDP growth
expectations, was concentrated at the front end of the yield curve. GDP growth expectations
were important only for long-term government bond yields. Monetary policy is still important
for asset pricing across the yield curve. Like in the bulk of the previous excercises, the funda-
mentals played no role in case of exchange rates, and risk perception and ECB policy are of
no relevance for pricing of any EM assets during Fed tightening.
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6 Conclusions
The paper provided evidence of a market impact of the Feds monetary policy tightening, as
well as the identiﬁcation of the underlying determinants.
The main ﬁnding of the paper is proving that the degree of the Fed tightening of 2015-2018
impact on markets was largely dependent on policies, with the predominant role of mostly
monetary policies, followed by macroprudential and, to a way lesser extent, ﬁscal policies. The
role of fundamentals, in turn, limited for all EMs, proved relatively large for the CEEMEA
economies. In addition, for CEEMEA, there is some evidence, yet very limited, of an impact
of political and economic risk on the scale of depreciation of currencies resulting from the Fed
tightening. At the same time, the policies of others, in this case the ECB, were irrelevant
for market developments. This notwithstanding, there is some evidence that it might have
contained the scale of the stock price increases in some EMs.
The scale of reaction to the Fed actions toward the end of the cycle was also quite large,
showing that the pace of tightening surprised the markets, particularly in Latin America. The
response of Latin American economies was initially muted, yet, as the Fed proceeded with
the reducing its balance sheet size, it became stronger. The CEEMEA markets, conversely,
responded strongly at ﬁrst to take the Fed policy decisions and operations related to tightening
that followed quite calmly.
These results provide a good starting point for further studies. Most notably, in terms
of methodology for identifying the events associated with the Fed tightening among FOMC
members speeches, I intend to apply more sophisticated contextual text mining techniques.
In addition, the risk and ECB policy measures could be improved to conﬁrm or reject the
importance of both for EM asset pricing during the Feds tightening phase of 2015-2018. With
the improved methodology, I aim to investigate EM market reaction during the entire policy
cycle of 2008-2018. The latter extension may also include the data on actual capital ﬂows,
apart from market pricing, thereby providing a more comprehensive assessment of the investors
motivation and behaviour over the entire cycle.
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A Figures
Figure 1: Use of monetary policy tools by the Fed in 2004-2019
source: Fed.
Figure 2: Interest rate changes equivalent to monetary policy accommodation in the subsequent
phases of the Fed unconventional monetary policy
source: Fed, calculations based on Reynard (2018).
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Figure 3: Change in EM exchange rates against their respective current account balances
Note: for the exchange rates, the positive numbers denote depreciation. This applies to
the remaining of the paper.
Source: Bloomberg.
Figure 4: 5-tear term premia estimates
Note: CEE-3 – Poland, Czechia and Hungary, Asia – India, Indonesia, Philippines, South Korea
and Thailand, LATAM – Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru. This applies to the remaining
of the paper.
Source: Bloomberg, calculations based on Cochrane and Piazessi (2005).
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Figure 5: Characteristics of speeches studied
Figure 6: Macroprudential policy indices by country groups
Source: IMF, central banks and ﬁnancial regulators, calculations based on Carreras et al. (2018).
Figure 7: Frequency of search for parliament phrase in Poland and the exchange rate of the
Polish zloty versus the US dollar
Source: Bloomberg, Google Trends.
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Figure 8: Risk perception indices RISKt by country groups, September 2014 = 100
Source: Google Trends, calculations based on Baker et al. (2016).
Figure 9: ECB monetary policy stance ECBt, September 2014 = 100
Source: Google Trends.
Figure 10: Event study results for ﬁxed income market across time (monthly averages)
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Figure 11: Event study results for the exchange rates and equity prices across time (monthly
averages)
Figure 12: Event study results (in number of standard deviations)
Note: Yellower hue indicates a larger impact of Fed tightening, while bluer – smaller. This means
that the yellower the colour, the greater the rise in yields, depreciation of the currency or fall in
stock market prices in response to Fed tightening.
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B Tables
Name of variable Source Adnotation
2Y gvt bond yields Bloomberg NA for Colombia
5Y gvt bond yields Bloomberg NA for Brazil and
S. Africa
10Y gvt yields Bloomberg not available for S.
Africa
term premia own calculations -
exchange rates Bloomberg -
stock indices Bloomberg -
Table 1: Financial data sources and limitations
Speaches overall 859
mentioning tightening 505
of which market movers 209
mentioning only rates 292
of which market movers 134
Documents overall 69
statements 35
of which market movers 18
minutes 34
of which market movers 17
Operations 6
of which market movers 3
Table 2: Characteristics of speeches, documents and operations studied
27
EM economy US Germany Japan
Poland 0.46 0.86 0.82
Czechia 0.64 0.91 0.89
Hungary 0.32 0.80 0.79
Turkey 0.60 0.47 0.55
S. Africa 0.60 0.37 0.41
India 0.13 0.39 0.23
Indonesia 0.57 0.64 0.70
Philippines 0.42 0.57 0.52
Thailand 0.57 0.73 0.80
S. Korea 0.69 0.96 0.92
Brazil 0.10 0.24 0.28
Chile 0.53 0.88 0.76
Colombia 0.67 0.79 0.81
Peru 0.37 0.32 0.38
Mexico 0.52 0.31 0.42
Table 3: Correlation coeﬃcients between 5-year term premia
CEE-3 TR+ZA LATAM ASIA speeches docs oper.
2Y 0.48 0.86 -0.08 -0.27 1.03 0.53 0.73
5Y 1.19 1.20 0.84 0.12 2.20 -0.63 -0.90
10Y 1.23 1.16 0.33 0.34 2.25 -0.93 0.00
TP 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.03 -0.12
ER 0.06 0.09 0.02 -0.03 0.12 0.29 -0.25
EQ 0.31 0.28 0.06 0.23 0.28 0.06 1.38
Table 4: Event study average results across country groups and events
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2Y 5Y 10Y ER EQ
ℵ 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.74) (0.70)
τ 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.08*** 0.97 1.29
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.75) (0.70)
υ -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.07*** -0.85 -0.91
(0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.75) (0.69)
ψ 0.57 0.24 0.54 -0.11 -0.28
(1.25) (2.78) (2.40) (2.47) (2.75)
φ 0.44 -0.11 -0.65 0.15 -0.73
(1.28) (2.79) (2.44) (2.49) (2.76)
φ 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(1.19) (2.75) (2.32) (2.34) (2.69)
Table 5: Estimation results for equation (9)
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2Y 5Y 10Y ER EQ
GDP t -0.19 -0.48 -0.02 0.00 -0.08
(0.01) (0.28) (0.47) (0.02) (0.06)
CPIt 0.81*** 0.75*** 0.75*** -0.04*** -0.06*
(0.15) (0.17) (0.22) (0.01) (0.04)
FISCt -0.13 -0.38 -0.78* 0.01 0.06
(0.30) (0.50) (0.42) (0.02) (0.05)
CAt -0.52*** -0.41 -0.41* 0.00 0.06*
(0.17) (0.50) (0.21) (0.01) (0.03)
RESt -1.08 -0.96 -1.07 0.00 0.18
(1.03) (1.02) (1.37) (0.07) (0.19)
LOAN t -1.05 -1.30 -2.43 -0.03 0.16
(1.38) (1.19) (1.62) (0.09) (0.23)
INT t -0.06 0.13 -0.17 0.07 -0.02
(0.61) (0.74) (1.04) (0.04) (0.12)
MACROPRU t 0.08* 0.06 -0.04 0.07** 0.02**
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.01) (0.01)
IRt 0.52*** 0.59*** 0.54*** -0.02 -0.05***
(0.36) (0.08) (0.11) (0.01) (0.02)
RISKt -0.40 -1.34 2.64 0.13 -0.39
(3.59) (3.99) (5.42) (0.29) (0.75)
ECBt 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.01
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.01) (0.01)
Table 6: Estimates of βti for equation (6) – all EMs
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2Y 5Y 10Y ER EQ
R2 = 0.52 R2 = 0.52 R2 = 0.52 R2 = 0.46 R2 = 0.40
GDP t 0.20 -0.08 0.26 -0.02 0.05
(0.35) (0.52) (0.59) (0.03) (0.07)
CPIt -0.54 -1.13 -1.29* -0.07 0.02
(0.56) (0.65) (0.81) (0.05) (0.12)
FISCt 0.72 -0.51 0.09 0.01 -0.02
(0.43) (0.57) (0.55) (0.03) (0.08)
CAt -0.13 0.11 0.16 -0.01 0.03
(0.23) (0.27) (0.36) (0.02) (0.04)
RESt -1.23 -0.46 -0.62 -0.03 -0.02
(1.20) (1.38) (1.74) (0.09) (0.38)
LOAN t 3.06* 0.91 -0.95 -0.17 -0.02
(1.87) (1.79) (2.55) (0.14) (0.38)
INT t 0.25 1.81 1.72 0.07 -0.09
(0.71) (1.23) (1.73) (0.05) (0.14)
MACROPRU t 0.03 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.00
(0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.01) (0.01)
IRt 1.09*** 1.59 1.62 0.00 -0.05
(0.37) (0.44) (0.52) (0.02) (0.08)
RISKt -1.65 0.47 -1.26 0.18 -0.37
(4.52) (4.52) (6.49) (0.31) (0.83)
ECBt 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.01
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.01) (0.01)
Table 7: Estimates of βti for equation (10) – all EMs
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2Y 5Y 10Y ER EQ
GDP t 1.17 0.16 2.69 0.07 -0.07
(0.97) (1.49) (2.47) (0.08) (0.14)
CPIt 1.28*** 0.39 0.90** -0.06*** -0.04
(0.20) (0.29) (0.35) (0.02) (0.04)
FISCt -0.34 -0.83 -1.45 0.03 0.00
(0.96) (0.80) (1.70) (0.07) (0.13)
CAt -0.98*** -0.42 -0.84 0.04* 0.05
(0.29) (0.30) (0.53) (0.03) (0.05)
RESt -5.24*** -2.78 -5.01 0.29* 0.34
(1.94) (1.63) (3.21) (0.53) (0.31)
LOAN t -6.99 -6.49* -8.19 0.52 0.30
(4.61) (3.65) (7.92) (0.34) (0.66)
INT t -1.11 -3.62* -5.75 0.15* 0.05
(1.10) (2.04) (4.09) (0.07) (0.15)
MACROPRU t 1.19*** -0.17*** 0.10 0.01* 0.00
(0.07) (0.06) (0.11) (0.01) (0.01)
IRt 0.93*** 0.31*** 0.72*** -0.04*** -0.05*
(0.11) (0.11) (0.18) (0.01) (0.02)
RISKt -2.02 0.68 6.48 0.94* -0.10
(7.70) (5.62) (12.03) (0.57) (1.12)
ECBt 0.00 -0.03 -0.02 0.00 0.01
(0.01) (0.04) (0.11) (0.01) (0.01)
Table 8: Estimates of βti for equation (6) – CEEMEA economies
Note: CEEMEA – Poland, Czechia, Hungary, South Africa and Turkey.
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2Y 5Y 10Y ER EQ
R2 = 0.51 R2 = 0.50 R2 = 0.52 R2 = 0.37 R2 = 0.58
GDP t 0.20
(0.49)
CPIt 0.95***
(0.35)
FISCt -0.12
(0.21)
CAt -0.12 -0.02 0.02
(0.21) (0.02) (0.03)
RESt -0.82
(1.10)
LOAN t 2.52* -0.17
(1.50) (0.14)
INT t -0.06 1.48** 1.17 0.06 -0.06
(0.61) (0.67) (1.06) (0.05) (0.11)
MACROPRU t 0.08* 0.01
(0.04) (0.07)
IRt 1.02*** 1.54*** 1.49*** -0.04
(0.34) (0.41) (0.46) (0.02)
RISKt
ECBt
Table 9: Estimates of βti for equations with optimum ﬁt – all EMs
33
2Y 5Y 10Y ER EQ
GDP t -0.51*** 0.24 -1.49*** -0.02* -2.37***
(0.18) (0.29) (0.29) (0.01) (0.13)
CPIt 0.81*** 1.11*** 1.27*** 0.07*** 1.22***
(0.35) (0.15) (0.19) (0.01) (0.12)
FISCt -0.62*** -0.57* -0.78* 0.00 -1.05***
(0.19) (0.34) (0.42) (0.01) (0.12)
CAt -0.73*** -0.61*** -0.72*** 0.01 0.03
(0.12) (0.10) (0.14) (0.01) (0.04)
RESt -0.68 1.27* -1.30 -0.04 -1.58***
(0.67) (0.68) 0.93 (0.05) (0.07)
LOAN t 2.90*** -2.69*** 3.84*** -0.09 2.67***
(0.97) (0.83) (1.13) (0.06) (0.68)
INT t -0.06 -0.09 -0.04 0.10*** -0.99*
(0.61) (0.51) (0.06) (0.03) (0.47)
MACROPRU t 0.08* 0.06 -0.04 0.02* 1.73***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.01) (0.09)
IRt 0.67*** 0.80*** 0.84** -0.03*** -1.23***
(0.08) (0.09) (0.11) (0.01) (0.10)
RISKt 0.85 -2.18 8.65 0.13 1.35
(2.48) (2.91) (3.61) (0.18) (1.81)
ECBt -0.01 -0.02 -0.04 -0.02*** -1.85***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.10)
Table 10: Estimates of βti for equation (10) – all EMs
34
2Y 5Y 10Y ER EQ
GDP t 0.12 0.31 -0.53* -0.02 0.07**
(0.20) (0.27) (0.29) (0.05) (0.04)
CPIt 0.54*** -0.08 0.23 0.02 0.02
(0.13) (0.13) (0.19) (0.01) (0.03)
FISCt -0.54*** -0.22 -0.18 0.00 -0.08**
(0.20) (0.25) (0.28) (0.05) (0.04)
CAt 0.16* -0.10 -0.11 0.01 -0.01
(0.10) (0.08) (0.14) (0.01) (-0.02)
RESt -1.17* -0.48 -0.83 0.09 -0.10
(0.64) (0.49) 0.93 (0.10) (0.12)
LOAN t 1.63** -0.05 1.03 0.11 0.09
(0.80) (0.59) (1.13) (0.22) (0.15)
INT t -0.66* -0.38 -0.04 0.03 -0.06
(0.40) (0.41) (0.06) (0.04) (0.08)
MACROPRU t 0.14*** -0.01 -0.04 0.00 0.00
(0.05) (0.08) (0.06) (0.01) (0.01)
IRt 0.35*** -0.01 0.31** 0.01 0.02
(0.08) (0.09) (0.12) (0.01) (0.02)
RISKt 1.64 -0.53 -3.36 0.54 0.02
(2.55) (2.21) (3.61) (0.37) (0.49)
ECBt -0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.00)
Table 11: Estimates of βti for equation (11) – all EMs
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